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STUDENT SUSPENSION FOR POSSESSION OF
CONTRABAND IN STUDENT VEHICLES: CORRECT
GUIDANCE FROM THE TENTH CIRCUIT
LARRY LEWIS*
L Introduction
An administrator of a large high school in Midwest City, Oklahoma noticed
that a car parked in the school parking lot did not have, as required by the
school, a parking permit hanging from the rear view mirror.1 When the
administrator looked through the side window to see if a permit was on the seat
or floor of the vehicle, he observed knives in the passenger door console.2 When
the school determined the identity of the student who drove the vehicle, the
school requested the student to open the car.' The school discipline code
banned weapon possession on school property, including knives with more than
a two-and-one-half-inch blade.' Based on the administrator's sighting of the
weapon on school property, the administration disciplined the student with a
short-term suspension.'
The student sought an injunction in the district court of Oklahoma County,
alleging denial of due process.6 The student claimed that weeks earlier he had
borrowed his father's knives to install a new speaker system in the vehicle, and
he merely had forgotten to take the knives out of his car when he finished.7 He
argued that his forgetfulness to take the knives out of his car and his lack of
* Attorney, Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, Tulsa and Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. B.A.,
Oklahoma State University, 1970; J.D., Georgetown University, 1973. Formerly served for
nineteen years as General Counsel for the Oklahoma State School Boards Association.
1. Petition, Ex. F (School District "Findings of Fact") at 2, 1 3, Mahan v. Mid-Del Sch.
Dist. (Okla. County Dist. Ct.) (No. CJ-2002-7539).
2. Id. at4, 2.
3. Id. at 1, 2.
4. Id. at 1, 1.
5. ld. at 7.
6. Petition, Mahan v. Mid-Del Sch. Dist. (Okla. County Dist. Ct.) (No. CJ-2002-7539).
The local media gave the issue extensive coverage. Coverage included several television news
broadcasts and the following articles: Ann Kelley, Midwest City Student's Suspension
Reversed, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 5, 2002, at IA; Ann Kelley, Student Faces Alternative
School, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 6,2002, at IA; Ann Kelley, District Judge to Hear Student's
Case, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 7, 2002, at 2A; Ann Kelley, Judge's Order Allows Wrestler
Back In Class, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 10, 2002, at IA; Ann Kelley, Suspended Wrestler To
Transfer, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 17, 2002, at IA.
7. Plaintiff's Trial Brief, Mahan v. Mid-Del Sch. Dist. (Okla. County Dist. Ct.) (No. CJ-
2002-7539).
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intent to harm anyone prevented him from "possessing" the weapons in violation
of the school discipline code.8 The parties settled the case, and no Oklahoma
courts have since issued opinions regarding the necessary intent or knowledge
required for a student to "possess" a weapon in violation of school policy.9
Despite the lack of Oklahoma precedent, other courts, including the Tenth
Circuit, have decided whether suspension of a student who possesses a weapon
on school property violates the student's substantive due process rights. These
courts have addressed cases where the student parks a vehicle containing a
weapon on school property, but claims that he did not intend to transport the
weapon to school or use it to injure or threaten others.' Specifically, these
courts have determined whether weapons possession requires knowing
possession. " Oklahoma courts can look to these opinions when deciding cases
with facts similar to those presented above. 2
This Article examines how courts apply substantive due process to student
suspensions for contraband in student vehicles. Part II reviews the Sixth
Circuit's decision in Seal v. Morgan,13 and contends that the appellate court
incorrectly decided this case in light of school needs and existing case law. Part
HI examines court opinions that have affirmed school authority to suspend
students for possessing contraband in cars on school property. Next, Part IV
discusses the Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Butler v. Rio Rancho Public
Schools Board ofEducation.14 Part V briefly describes the revised "possession"
policy adopted by the Midwest City school district mentioned above. This
Article concludes that Butler correctly recognized the purpose of school anti-
weapon policies and relevant case law. The Butler decision provides guidance
for Oklahoma school districts in the formation of "possession" discipline codes
that will withstand substantive due process scrutiny.
II. Seal v. Morgan: "Possession" of a Weapon Requires "Knowing"
Possession
A. Facts
Ray Pritchert, a high school student at Powell High School in Knox County,
Tennessee, carried a hunting knife for protection against feared hostile acts by
8. Id.
9. Mahan v. Mid-Del Sch. Dist., No. CJ-2002-7539 (Okla. County Dist. Ct.).
10. See, e.g., Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 571-73 (6th Cir. 2000).
11. Compare id. at 575-76 with Bundick v. Bay City Indep. Sch. Dist., 140 F. Supp. 2d
735, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
12. See, e.g., Mahan, No. CJ-2002-7539.
13. 229 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2000).
14. 341 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2003).
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another high school student who was dating Pritchert's ex-girlfriend. 5 On
October 30, 1996, Pritchert showed the knife to his friend and fellow classmate,
Dustin Seal.16 The next evening, Seal, accompanied by Pritchert and another
friend, David Richardson, drove his mother's car to pick up his girlfriend from
her house. 17 At some point during the drive, Pritchert placed the knife on the
floorboard of the car behind the driver's seat.18 When Seal left the car to walk
to the door of his girlfriend's house, Richardson placed the knife in the glove
compartment of the vehicle.'9
The following evening Seal drove his girlfriend and Pritchert to the high
school for a football game.2" All three students were members of the Powell
High School band and were scheduled to perform at the game.2' Shortly after
Seal and Pritchert entered the school building, the band director and the vice-
principal, Charles Mashburn, summoned both students into the band director's
office.22 Mashburn told Seal and Pritchert that four students had reported seeing
them drinking alcohol.23 After questioning the students and searching their
belongings, Mashburn announced that he needed to search Seal's car because
an assistant band director had reported that he had observed the students sharing
a flask, checking each other's breath, and passing chewing gum.24 Seal
consented to the search of his mother's car.'
Although Mashburn failed to find a flask, he did find two cigarettes, a bottle
of prescription drugs, and Pritchert's knife in the glove compartment of Seal's
car.26 Mashburn asked Seal to accompany him to his office and explain in
writing why there was a knife in his car.27 Seal wrote that "[t]he knife was there
because [Pritchert's] ex-girlfriend's boyfriend had been following [them] around
with a few of his friends so [they] were a little uneasy."28 A few days later, the
high school principal conducted a disciplinary hearing and suspended Seal,
pending expulsion, for possessing the knife in violation of school policy.
2 9
15. Seal, 229 F.3d at 570-7 1.
16. Id.












29. ld. at 572. The school district's policy provided that "students may not possess, handle,
transmit, use or attempt to use any dangerous weapon [including knives] in school buildings or
2004]
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Seal appealed his punishment to the board of education's disciplinary hearing
authority.3° At the appeal hearing, Seal testified that he knew Pritchert was
carrying the knife on October 31, but was unaware that the knife was in his car
the following day when he parked on school property.3 The hearing authority
affirmed Seal's suspension.32 On appeal to the full board of education, Seal's
attorney argued that Seal had no idea that the knife was in his mother's car and
that Seal did not "knowingly" possess the weapon on school property.33 The
board voted unanimously to uphold Seal's expulsion. 
n
Seal initiated an action in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.35
Seal claimed, among other things, that the board's actions violated his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.36 The district court denied the
board's motion for summaryjudgment on the due process claim, 37 and the board
appealed to the Sixth Circuit.38
B. Majority's Analysis
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by noting that although a student has a
property interest in continued education and is entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard,39 the touchstone of the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive due process clause is protection against arbitrary government
action.' Government action that burdens a fundamental right must pass strict
scrutiny and will only be upheld if the action is narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest.41 To determine whether government action
offends a student's substantive due process rights, the court must look to
whether the school policy interferes with a "fundamental" constitutional
interest.42 The Sixth Circuit correctly acknowledged that a state-created right to
on school grounds at any time and that students who [violate] the policy shall be subject to
suspension and/or expulsion of not less than one... year." Id. at 573 (internal quotations
omitted).




34. Id. at 572-73.
35. Id. at 573. Seal's father initiated the action on Seal's behalf in district court. Id. Once
Seal turned eighteen years old, he was substituted as the plaintiff. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 574.
39. Id. (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)).
40. See id. at 574-75; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998)
(citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974)).
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attend public school is not a "fundamental" constitutional right.
43 Because
Seal's interest in his continued education was not fundamental, the court
determined that the school anti-weapon policy would be upheld only if it was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest."4
In ruling on Seal's argument, the Sixth Circuit found that a substantive due
process challenge may be applicable to school discipline only in the "rare case"
where no rational relationship exists between the punishment and the offense.
45
According to the majority, the circumstances of Seal's suspension fit this "rare
case" exception.' Despite its acknowledgment that the Supreme Court has
explicitly warned courts not to set aside decisions of school administrators on
the basis that courts may view them as lacking in wisdom or compassion,
47 the
majority held that suspending a student for possessing a weapon, when that
student was "totally unaware" of the weapon's presence, was not rationally
related to any legitimate state interest.48
The majority explained its holding through one cursory observation of case
law and two inapposite hypothetical school situations. First, the court stated that
substantive criminal law ordinarily implies knowing or conscious possession.
49
Although the majority cited several cases holding that possession in a criminal
statute normally means conscious possession,5° it ignored the vast number of
cases recognizing the difference between criminal proceedings and
administrative proceedings, which frequently occur in the educational
environment."
43. Seal, 229 F.3d at 575 (noting that in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973), the Supreme Court explicitly held that the right to attend
public school is not a fundamental right for purposes of a substantive due process analysis).
44. Id. In other words, a discipline rule will be upheld against substantive due process
charges unless the rule shocks the conscience of judges or lacks any reasonable relationship to
a legitimate state interest. See Wagner v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 255 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922
(N.D. Ind. 2003).
45. Seal, 229 F.3d at 575 (quoting Rosa R. v. Connelly, 889 F.2d 435,439 (2d Cir. 1989)).
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Wagner, 255 F. Supp. 2d
at 918 ("[D]ue process does not require the judicializing of school disciplinary proceedings.")
(quoting Osteen v. Henley, 13 F.3d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1993)).
48. Seal, 229 F.3d at 575 ("No student can use a weapon to injure another person, to
disrupt school operations, or, for that matter, any other purpose if the student is totally unaware
of its presence.").
49. Id. at 575-76.
50. Id. at 576 (citing United States v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 972,973 (D.C. Cir. 1983) and United
States v. Sawyer, 294 F.2d 24, 29 (4th Cir. 1961), among other cases, as examples).
51. The educational environment necessitates close supervision of students, as well as
"enforcement of rules against conduct" otherwise "permissible if undertaken by an adult." New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985). While children do not "shed their constitutional
rights... at the schoolhouse gate," Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
2004]
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The majority then explained its holding through two inapposite analogies.
The first hypothetical supposes the suspension of a valedictorian for weapons
possession after a vindictive student slips a knife in the valedictorian's backback
without the scholar's knowledge.52 The second analogy posits a school
suspending a student for possessing and consuming punch at a school dance
after another student secretly spiked the punch.53 The majority explained that
under the board's policy, these innocent students would also be subject to
suspension and that such school policies would not rationally advance the
school's relative interests.' Using these analogies for Seal's case, the majority
concluded that the school's zero tolerance policy on weapons possession was
not rationally related to a legitimate school interest.5 The court then affirmed
the district court's judgment to the extent that it denied the board's motion for
summary judgment.5 6
C. Dissent
While the dissent agreed with the majority that a school discipline decision
would only survive a substantive due process challenge if it was rationally
related to a legitimate state interest, the dissenting judge would have held that
the board's decision to expel Seal was rational for several reasons.57 First, the
dissent noted that the public education system depends on school
503, 506 (1969), the nature of those rights extends only to what is appropriate conduct in
school, Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). One court, for example,
declined to read into a suspension policy on fighting a requirement that the school must prove
the student intended to cause personal injury. Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 623 N.W.2d
672, 680 (Neb. 2001) (refusing to bar discipline of a student who alleged that his infliction of
physical harm upon others was accidental). Because of the "wide range of unanticipated
conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as
detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions." Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (emphasis added). For examples of other cases illustrating
the differences between suspension or expulsion hearings and criminal proceedings, see
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (holding that schools may search students without complying with
the probable cause standard invoked in criminal trials); Schneider v. Board of School Trustees,
Fort Wayne Community Schools, 255 F. Supp. 2d 891, 899 (N.D. Ind. 2003) (holding that
students facing suspension enjoy no right to cross-examine witnesses for reliability or sincerity
or even to learn the identities of student accusers); James v. Unified School District No. 512,
899 F. Supp. 530,534 (D. Kan. 1995) (noting that "[s]chool disciplinary hearings are not quasi-
criminal proceedings" and that the exclusionary rule does not apply) (internal quotations
omitted).
52. Seal, 229 F.3d at 576.
53. Id. at 578.
54. Id. at 576, 578.
55. See id. at 579.
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administrators' discretion and judgment and that Congress did not intend § 1983
as a "'vehicle for federal-court corrections of errors [that] do not rise to the level
of violations of specific constitutional guarantees." 5 8 The dissent argued that
the court "should not further hamstring" the educational process "by substituting
its judgment on matters relating to the safety of students for that of school
administrators and school board members."59
Second, the dissent emphasized the "enormous responsibility" that schools
have in educating youth and "the potentially devastating consequences of
weapons on campus .... ,"o Given the national landscape of violence on school
campuses, the dissent correctly determined that a strict ban on weapons is
rationally related to the legitimate government interest of "protecting our
children from the very real threat of violence.'
The dissent also found the valedictorian analogy inapt. The dissent argued
that unlike the clueless valedictorian, Seal knew that Pritchert' s knife was in his
mother's car the previous day and that Pritchert was keeping the weapon
accessible in case of a fight with his ex-girlfriend's boyfriend.62 A more apt
comparison, the dissent reasoned, would have been if a friend gave the
valedictorian a knife, the valedictorian placed the knife in his own coat pocket,
and the friend then retrieved the knife without the valedictorian's knowledge
and transferred the weapon to the valedictorian's backpack, which the
valedictorian carried to school.63 Under this scenario, the valedictorian, like
Seal, would have known about his friend's knife.'
The dissent concluded by discussing the faulty premise upon which the
majority rested its decision and the effects of the majority's ruling. The dissent
argued that there was ample proof of scienter based on Seal's written statement
and testimony before the board.65 Even if the majority did not agree that Seal's
signed confession and testimony were sufficient proof of knowing possession,
the dissent contended that the court could impute scienter based on Seal's
possession of the knife.6  Finally, the dissent noted the "far-reaching
58. Id. (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975)).
59. Id. at 583.
60. Id. at 582 (mentioning the Columbine High School massacre as an example).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 584.
63. Id. at 584 n.2.
64. Id. The spiked punch bowl hypothetical is also a false analogy. No valid comparison
exists between a student who drives his car on school premises with knowledge that a dangerous
weapon was in the car the previous day and a student who drinks school-supplied and school-
prepared punch at a school dance without knowledge of contamination by a clandestine punch-
spiker.
65. Id. at 585.
66. Id.
2004]
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implications" of the majority's decision, such as the majority's requirement that
school boards essentially include a scienter requirement in weapons and drug
policies.67
III. Other Decisions: Knowledge of Possession Is Not Required
Other courts have considered the same issues as the Sixth Circuit in Seal v.
Morgan, including (1) whether suspension of a student who possesses a weapon
on school property violates the student's substantive due process rights, and (2)
whether weapon possession on school property requires knowledge of
possession. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, however, these courts have reached the
opposite conclusion.
In Bundick v. Bay City Independent School District,68 the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of Texas considered whether scienter could be imputed
from the fact of possession.69 The plaintiff, David Bundick, brought a § 1983
action against the school district after the school expelled him for having a knife
in his vehicle on school property.70 Bundick claimed that his expulsion was
arbitrary and capricious, in violation of his right to substantive due process.71
Specifically, Bundick argued that the school had failed to show the necessary
culpable mental state to justify punishment.7' Bundick contended that he did not
have the necessary mental state to "possess" a weapon in violation of school
policy because he merely neglected to remove his machete from his truck after
work on the previous day.73 In support of his contention, Bundick cited the
majority opinion in Seal.74
The federal district court rejected Bundick's argument, declaring that the
dissenting judge in Seal "has a better understanding of the law in this area., 75
The court did not find a requirement of scienter in the district's anti-weapons
policy and would not read a knowledge requirement into the school board's
discipline code.76 The court determined that scienter could be imputed from
67. Id. at 586.
68. 140 F. Supp. 2d 735 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
69. Id. at 740.
70. Id. at 739-41.
71. Id. at740.
72. Id.
73. See id. In his part-time job, Bundick used a machete, and he transported his work
materials, including the machete, in a toolbox located in his truck. Id. The machete surfaced
at school when a drug-detection dog alerted to Bundick's parked truck. Id. at 738.
74. Id. at 740.
75. Id.
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Bundick's awareness of the machete's presence in the truck, even if he had
forgotten to take the knife out of the toolbox before coming to school.77
In ruling for the school district, the court stressed that in the context of school
discipline, punishment implicates no substantive due process concerns unless a
school's actions do not relate to the legitimate goal of maintaining a safe
learning environment.7 8 To be arbitrary and capricious in violation of a
student's right to substantive due process, a school discipline decision must be
patently unreasonable, in total disregard of the circumstances, and lacking any
basis to reasonably arrive at the same conclusion.79 Just as there are valid safety
reasons to mandate that public library patrons wear shoes in the library - such
as avoiding unsanitary conditions in the library8° - there is a legitimate reason
to direct students not to transport contraband onto school property. If clean feet
form a valid health requirement to prevent library users from infection and
injury, then requiring student vehicles on school campuses to be "clean" of
weapons and contraband also represents a valid safety interest. Because school
officials are in the best position to determine when a student's actions threaten
the safety and welfare of other students, courts should grant school officials
"substantial" or "considerable" deference in their disciplinary choices.81
IV. Butler v. Rio Rancho Public Schools Board of Education: A Student Can
Be Charged for What the Student Should Have Known About the Contents of
a Vehicle
In Butlerv. Rio Rancho Public Schools Board ofEducation, the Tenth Circuit
addressed the issue of "whether a school's decision to suspend a student when
he should have known he was bringing a weapon onto school property violates
the student's substantive due process right[s] .... ',82 The plaintiff in this case,
Stephen Butler, brought a § 1983 action on behalf of his son, Joshua, who was
77. Id. Bundick correctly recognizes the "heavy burden" that would be imposed on schools
if administrators had to uncover and establish a student's reasons for violating school policy.
See also Watson ex rel. Watson v. Beckel, 242 F.3d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001).
78. See Bundick, 140 F. Supp. 2d. at 741; see also James v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 899
F. Supp. 530, 534 (D. Kan. 1995) (noting that regulation of student conduct and behavior in
itself does not violate substantive due process).
79. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82 (2000).
80. Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of the Columbus Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585, 596 (6th Cir.
2003).
81. Gibson v. Caruthersville Sch. Dist. No. 8,336 F.3d 768,773 (8th Cir. 2003); Schneider
v. Bd. of Sch. Trs., Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 255 F. Supp. 2d 891, 902 (N.D. Ind. 2003); Doe
v. Superintendent of Schs. of Stoughton, 767 N.E.2d 1054, 1057-58 (Mass. 2002).
82. Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 341 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotations omitted).
2004]
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suspended for bringing weapons onto school property. 3 On the day in question,
Joshua drove his brother's car to school and parked in the faculty parking lot
without a parking permit8'4 When the security guard stopped at the vehicle to
check for a permit, he "observed the butt end of a knife sticking up from
between the passenger seat and the center console." 5 The guard summoned
Joshua to open the vehicle and found a hunting knife, gun, and ammunition. 6
These items belonged to Joshua's brother.8 7
After a disciplinary hearing and an appeal hearing before the school board,
the school suspended Joshua for one year.88 On appeal to the federal district
court, the plaintiffs argued that the school violated Joshua's substantive due
process right "to a free public education" by suspending him for one year
"without finding that he knowingly/intentionally brought, carried or kept a
weapon or firearm on school grounds."8 9 Echoing the majority opinion in Seal,
the district court announced that "suspending a student for unknowingly
transporting a weapon onto the school campus does not rationally support the
legitimate state interest in maintaining school safety and discipline. '
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court has not
delineated what type of interest triggers substantive due process guarantees, an
issue also left unanswered by circuit case law.9' Nevertheless, the court
determined that there was no need to decide if Joshua had a substantive due
process right to his education because assuming the right did apply to
suspensions from school, Joshua failed to state a substantive due process
violation.92 Rather, the court found that the district court wrongly concluded
that Joshua was suspended for "unknowingly" bringing a knife onto school
property.93 Instead, the school board found that Joshua "should have known, as
83. Id. at 1199.
84. Id. at 1198.
85. Id. at 1198-99.
86. Id. at 1199.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1200.
90. Butler ex rel. Butler v. Rio Rancho Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198
(D. N.M. 2002).
91. Butler, 341 F.3d at 1200.
92. Id. The Tenth Circuit also noted that it "will uphold a school's decision to suspend a
student in the face of a substantive due process challenge if the decision is not arbitrary, lacking
a rational basis, or shocking to the conscience of federal judges." Id. at 1200-01. Although the
Tenth Circuit had previously employed the "shock the conscience of federal judges" standard
in reviewing actions taken by public educational institutions, the court did not determine
whether this standard or the requirement of rational basis is the appropriate analysis because the
school did not deny substantive due process rights under either standard. Id. at 1201 n.4.
93. Id. at 1201.
[Vol. 57:775
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the driver of the vehicle that he was in possession of and transporting a weapon
onto school grounds." 94 The court stated that Joshua should have been aware of
the knife's presence because "the knife was in plain view and readily
identifiable as a knife to persons standing outside the vehicle looking in" and
because Joshua "knew, or should have known that he was responsible for the
vehicle he brought onto school property and the contents thereof."9
The Tenth Circuit resisted deciding if suspension for "unknowingly"
transporting a weapon onto school property deprives a student of substantive
due process rights.96 Instead, the court determined only whether the suspension
of a student who should have known "he was bringing a weapon onto school
property violates the student's substantive due process rights, if any, to a public
education,"97 and concluded that it did not.
The court found that schools have a legitimate interest in providing a safe
environment for students and staff and that it was not unreasonable to assume
that the presence of accessible weapons on school property increases the threat
to this interest.98 To protect against school violence and advance the safety of
those on campus, the court stated, "[W]e believe there is a rational basis for the
School to suspend Mr. Butler, even for one year, when he should have known
he brought a weapon onto school property. The School's decision was not
arbitrary, nor does it shock the conscience."99
Butler correctly grasped that the objective of a zero tolerance policy is to
prevent the availability of weapons for student use. This paramount
consideration requires that students assume responsibility for what their vehicles
contain. Preventing accessibility to contraband rationally relates to the
legitimate school interest in maintaining a campus free from the threat of
violence.
V. The District's Revised Policy: A Guide
Following the enormous media attention aired and written about the
suspension for the Midwest City student discussed above, 0 the school district
amended its weapons possession policy.' 0' The policy specifically states that the







100. See supra Part I. Coverage in the Daily Oklahoman included the articles cited supra
note 6.
101. Policy J-18, Mid-Del Public Schools.
2004]
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on school property, and that a student will be deemed to "possess" the contents
of a vehicle driven by the student onto school property."° Under the policy,
students must ensure before driving a vehicle onto school property that whatever
vehicle the student drives or parks does not contain contraband prohibited by the
policy. °3 Thus, a student who drives or parks a vehicle on school property
remains responsible for what the vehicle contains, regardless who owns title to
the vehicle, who has been driving the vehicle, or who has been riding in the
vehicle. The policy provides notice to students that there is a duty of inspection
and therefore no defense to the presence of contraband, even if the student
claims that he was unaware of the contraband in the vehicle.
VI. Conclusion
The courts in Bundick and Butler properly recognize a school's heightened
concerns about the problems of weapons and violence on school premises.
These courts have accorded school officials substantial discretion in matters
regarding the safe operation of schools. The need to protect students and staff
from violent acts "is even greater today because of the horrific shooting
incidents and other acts of violence which have occurred at schools in the
United States and elsewhere in recent times. '1t 4
Substantive due process violations occur where a government act "in and of
itself' is "egregiously unacceptable, outrageous, or conscience-shocking."1 5
Requiring students to inspect and clean cars of any contraband before driving
those vehicles onto school property does not shock the conscience. The
requirement to inspect cars and remove any contraband is also rationally related
to ensuring student and faculty safety.
The Tenth Circuit in Butler has formed a reasonable and constitutional view
of school weapons policies: a student is accountable for what the student should
have known about the contents of student-driven vehicles. To protect students
and staff from harm, school districts should follow Butler by forming policies
that place the responsibility for a contraband-free vehicle upon students who
elect to drive a vehicle on school premises.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 576, 588 (M.D. La. 2004).
105. Demers ex rel. Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep't, 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, 205 (D. Mass.
2003) (quoting Amsden v. Moran, 904 F.2d 748, 754 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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